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Rhetoric of Reaction  
 
This calligraphy hangs in a jazz club in Sam-
cheongdong, a quarter of Seoul in the 
neighbourhood of the old Royal Palace and the 
Blue House, the modern Presidential Palace. The 
writer of this calligraphy was Park Chung Hee, 
whose photo is to the left of the calligraphy. 
Park Chung-Hee is considered by many as the 
father of the Miracle of the Han River, that is, of 
the economic success story of Korea. He also 
Calligraphy by Park Chung Hee 
„A Strong Country through Saving“ 
 
was a fierce dictator, the longer he lasted, the 
more so. Eventually, he was murdered in 1979 
by the head of his own KCIA. Although this was 
not the end of dictatorial government, opposi-
tion movements, paying a heavy toll of blood 
and repression, gained force and eventually de-
mocracy prevailed.  
 
Against this historic background, it seems awk-
ward to find that calligraphy by Park Chung Hee 
and a photo of his in a jazz club at only a few 
hundred meters from the Blue House, as the 
memories of the atrocities committed by his re-
gime are quite vivid still, at least in many peo-
ple’s mind. Wouldn’t at least some visitors feel 
offended by this calligraphy? Or would it, per-
haps, have been a sort of sanctuary for opposi-
tion forces, as for example in Czechoslovakia 
where an alternative culture flourished in Jazz 
Clubs during the Cold War?  
 
Well, jazz clubs did not play such a role in Korea 
and this one in particular, was established only a 
few years after dictatorship ended in 1987. Thus 
the mystery remains. Going 10000 kilometres to 
the west, in Spain, one comes across, not less 
surprising, portraits of Generalissimo Francisco 
Franco. In Spain, there are people and conserva-
tive newspapers, which harbour considerable 
goodwill and positive feelings toward the former 
dictator Francisco Franco. In fact, quite like in 
Korea, one easily discovers elements of a “rheto-
ric of reaction”, the title of a book written by 
Albert Hirschman in 19911, in public discourses 
in both countries. One of the basic motives of 
such rhetoric of reaction is the defence and even 
glorification of the orderly past and the con-
demnation of democratic discord and of liberal 
disorderliness. Interestingly, in both countries the 
conservative party in recent years had lost elec-
tions against all expectations. There could lie one 
key for understanding the riddle: Leftist govern-
ments quite naturally offer a fertile ground for 
the proliferation of the rhetoric of reaction.  
 
In Korea, the glorification of Park Chung Hee 
began in the middle of the 1990s. In an opinion 
survey by one of the large conservative newspa-
pers in Korea in April 1997, 75.9 percent of the 
respondents selected Park Chung Hee as the 
president who had fulfilled his duties best. A 
mere 3.7 percent selected President Kim Young 
Sam, who held office at that time. An opinion 
poll by the government produced a comparable 
outcome: Among the historic personalities of 
Korea, Park Chung Hee occupied with 23.4 per-
cent the first place in the esteem of the respon-
dents, followed by King Sejong, the famous 4th 
ruler of Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) with 18.8 
percent, and General Yi Sun-Shin, who van-
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quished the Japanese troops in 1591, with 14.1 
percent. It came as a shock to the victims and 
enemies of the Korean dictatorships that Park 
Chung Hee was in such high esteem only 10 
years after the resuscitation of democracy.2  
 
Amazingly, a pçÅáÉíó= Ñçê= íÜÉ=sÉåÉê~íáçå=çÑ=m~êâ=
`ÜìåÖ= eÉÉ and his wife Yuk Yong Su (ëìåÖJ
ãçÜçÉ), who had become victim of another as-
sassination attempt, was founded in 1997, while 
the conservative print media joined its campaign, 
while a novel written by Yi In Hwa, the author of 
the famous bestseller “Everlasting Empire”, glo-
rified Park Chung Hee and his deeds.3 The Park-
Chung-Hee syndrome became so ubiquitous and 
forceful that Kim Dae Jung, who had suffered 
heftily under Park Chung Hee, visited his birth-
place in company of Park Chung Hee’s son dur-
ing his election campaign. Kim Dae-Jung won 
the election, yet he had to form a coalition with 
Kim Jong Pil – who had been a confident of Park 
Chung Hee and the founder of the KCIA! 
 
In the context of the Park-Chung-Hee syndrome 
another, at least for the foreign observer, amaz-
ing phenomenon emerged: The daughter of 
Park Chung Hee became the president of the 
main opposition party Hanaradang (Grand Na-
tional Party). She lost the candidacy of her party 
for the presidential elections by a very narrow 
margin against Lee Myung-bak who eventually 
was elected as the new president of Korea in 
December 2007. Actually, she had grown up in 
the Blue House and assumed, after her mother’s 
assassination, the role of the First Lady. In her 
public appearances she cleverly used the images 
of “mother’s daughter” and “father’s daughter” 
and refers often to both of her parents. She 
does not allow anything negative to be said 
about them – and has survived politically amaz-
ingly well.  
 
One can only conclude that references to Park 
Chung Hee are not politically damaging, but, to 
the contrary, can be helpful. Park-Chung-Hee 
evokes positive associations in the mind of a 
more or less wide segment of Korean society. 
This is the basis of the Park-Chung-Hee syn-
drome. It is not easy to challenge it, be in public 
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and academic discourse or by institutions, like 
the Korea Democracy Foundation and the Truth 
Commission, which are supposed to clear the 
murky waters of Korean political history. Former 
opposition groups and present-day “progres-
sive” forces have to take it into account too.  
 
In other words, if you do not like Park Chung 
Hee’s calligraphy in the jazz club, either you do 
not go (“exit” in Hirschman’s terminology), or 
you go and do not say anything (no “voice”).4 
The latter might be seen as an expression of tol-
erance needed in democratic society. But, there 
is also the possibility that this issue is so divisive 
that it has become a taboo in society and public 
discourse.  
 
Whatever the case be, one wonders if the Park-
Chung-Hee syndrome has a more solid ideologi-
cal basis than just the rhetoric of reaction of cer-
tain political quarters. Certainly, Park is remem-
bered as the one who really started the whole 
process of economic take-off and he even seems 
to evoke the image of strict but ‘benign’ father 
figure who fell victim of his own right-hand man. 
In the collective memory he is bound to fare bet-
ter than Rhee Syng-Man and the two generals 
who followed him. So conservatives in Korea 
seem to have no one but Park to pay respect to 
and to take pride. Yet, the cornerstone of these 
perceptions is the economic success story associ-
ated with his name. That brings us back to his 
calligraphy – to his reference to savings.5
 
Accumulation regime 
 
His assertion that savings lead to national 
strength has a strange ring, even to economists 
nowadays. Savings are of course the flip side of 
investment. Park Chung Hee’s modernisation 
strategy required huge investments in industry 
and infrastructure and that meant the savings of 
his own people – even school children had to 
have their own savings account – from abroad. 
Savings were a necessary condition of his accu-
mulation regime. Furthermore, in his view, only 
a country with a strong economy could be a 
strong country/nation, economically and militar-
ily. Hence, the importance of savings.  
 
Park Chung Hee usurped power by a Åçìé=ÇÛ¨í~í 
in 1961 and promptly started to implement am-
 
4  Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Harvard 
University Press, 1970. 
5  My heartfelt thanks to Professor Cho Hyo-Je for com-
ments to this and other sections of this paper. 
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bitious plans to modernise the Korean economy. 
He had been able to observe methods of com-
prehensive economic planning when he was a 
Japanese officer in Manchuria. Possibly he drew 
inspiration too from North Korea, which at that 
time applied Soviet planning methods quite suc-
cessfully.6 Such planning by its very nature is the 
very opposite of the incrementalism, which 
economists then and now propagate so dili-
gently. The point of economic planning is not to 
adapt passively to the market forces, but to 
change your competitive situation through sys-
temic, roundabout modernisation in a middle 
and long-term perspective. 
 
With its limited resources and its low wages, Ko-
rea at that time at best could hope to develop 
some light industry, yet one could hardly expect 
that it would ever be able to catch up with 
North Korea, while it would continue to remain 
economically and politically dependent on the 
United States. To avoid this, Korea had to 
change its resource endowment and that meant 
to invest heavily in industry, technology and in-
frastructure.  
 
Such a modernising accumulation regime re-
quired plenty of capital. Where should the capi-
tal come from? Internal savings were weak. Yet, 
there were plenty of dollars coming into the 
country. In fact, American economic and military 
aid accounted for 75 percent of the military and 
50 percent of the civil budget.7 Much of that 
ended up in the black market and was used to 
buy foreign-produced goods, in detriment of 
local industry. Hence, it was not easy to redirect 
these funds to import foreign technology and 
know-how. Therefore, Park Chung Hee had to 
look for other sources of foreign capital too.  
First, he sent young Korean men into German 
mines and nurses into German hospitals. He 
made it quite clear that their sacrifices were for 
the good of the nation and its development. 
Second, as a result of normalisation with Japan 
in 1965, several hundred million dollars flowed 
into the country in the form of grants and in-
vestments. The works on the huge steel mill in 
Pohang started. Third, the Vietnam War became 
a true bonanza for the economy and much of 
the Korea-produced steel ended up there.  
 
The government maintained effective controls 
on much of the foreign exchange and chan-
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nelled it into the acquisition of technology, 
know-how and intermediary goods. It also con-
trolled the enterprises through the banks, which 
were all government owned, and the KCIA, 
which used the soft spots of the `Ü~ÉÄçä owners 
to pressure them. The terms of these so-called 
policy loans were quite favourable to enterprises. 
The ÅÜ~ÉÄçä, which were their main recipients, 
were “for all practical purposes … private agen-
cies of public purpose”8 Economic planning gave 
them relatively long, stable planning horizons. 
When things did not turn out as expected, firms 
could be sure to be bailed out, at least as long as 
they accepted the leadership of the State.  
 
In the logic of the planners, labour costs had to 
be kept low in order to secure the profitability of 
enterprises, which in turn had to invest whatever 
they earned. Social, and, for heavens sake, po-
litical unrest had to be suppressed at the roots. 
That was the task of the KCIA, which became 
ever larger and more powerful. Thus the political 
equivalent of the accumulation regime was dic-
tatorship.  
 
The breathtaking results of this regime are well 
known. A country with a per capita income of 
less than 100 Dollars9 at the beginning of the 
1960s became an industrial nation with high 
levels of sophistication, able to compete in some 
areas successfully with the best Japanese and 
German firms on world markets.  
 
Financial Market Regime  
 
Let us first have a look at the some merits of the 
accumulation regime. 
 
In Diagram 1 one can observe the yearly in-
creases in gross investment (at constant prices). 
It is astounding. Please note that investment 
growth is much lower nowadays than in the 
1960s, 70s and 80s. Private Consumption in-
creased in a much more stable fashion than in-
vestment, just below 10 percent every year. 
Again, nowadays growth rates are at much 
lower levels.  
 
8  ibid., p. 317, quoting Woo Jung-en, Race to the Swift: 
State and Finance in the Industrialization of Korea, Co-
lumbia University Press, 1991, p. 159. 
9  GNP per capita amounted to 82 US Dollar in 1961 pro 
Kopf (Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System). How-
ever, just the official US transfers to Korea between 
1945 and 1976 were in the order of 600 US Dollar per 
capita of the Korean population (Cumings, 1997, p. 
307). 
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A successful accumulation regime tends to pro-
duce its own resources for expansion. 10  It in-
creases the revenues of firms and government as 
well as, in spite of the repressive income policies 
of the government, the incomes of private 
households. In fact, private households, also at-
tracted by high interest rates, increased their 
saving rate gradually to almost 20 percent to-
ward the end of the 1980s. The accumulation 
regime gradually became independent of foreign 
savings. After the Asian financial crisis 1997/98, 
called “IMF crisis” in Korea, the country even 
became a huge exporter of capital, i.e. of inter-
nal savings, largely to finance the US double 
deficits (public households and balance of pay-
ment). The Korean economy recovered surpris-
ingly fast from this crisis, yet the growth rate of 
investment and consumption stayed way below 
earlier levels.  
 
The South Korean economy had known other 
crises too. The first one had set in in the early 
1970s. The economy had overheated. Short-
term interest rates in the curb market went up 
to 40 percent. The IMF almost ruined the econ-
omy, yet the government declared a debt mora-
torium for enterprises. Enterprises were more 
important than banks. In Park Chung Hee’s ac-
cumulation regime, banks clearly played a sub-
servient role to industry. The first oil shock in 
1973 almost passed unnoticed in the expansion 
that followed. 
 
The crisis of 1980-82 had different causes. The 
economy had already become highly export de-
pendent, in particular from the US markets. 
When Paul Volcker, the Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, allowed interests to float in October 
1979, the US economy entered a severe reces-
sion – and the Korean economy with it. An IMF 
stabilisation program made things only worse – 
until the Korean government took the reins in its 
own hands and implemented expansionary fiscal 
and monetary policies. Fortunately, Ronald 
Reagan did the same a bit later in the US 
(“Reaganomics”). As a result, Korean exports 
and its economy flourished again.  
 
In spite of Reaganomics, which clearly was a 
Keynesian recipe for economic expansion, the 
discourses on the economy in Korea (just like in 
the US and Europe) became more and more 
neo-liberal. The deregulation of financial mar-
                                                 
10  Franz Janossy, Wie die Akkumulationslawine ins Rollen 
kam. Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Kapitalismus, 
1979.
kets began, and Wall Street (the financial firms) 
became politically more influential than High 
Street (the enterprises producing real goodies). 
As a result the credit card business and other 
nice financial innovations swept the US and later 
the globe. One side effect of this was the reduc-
tion of the saving rate of US private households 
and their increasing indebtedness. This in turn 
made it impossible to finance the fiscal deficits 
of Reaganomics on the US capital market. Luck-
ily or not, the financial markets were deregu-
lated elsewhere too. Thus they became more 
international, and it became possible to finance 
the US budget and the rising trade deficits inter-
nationally, in other words using the savings of 
other countries to cover the shortage of savings 
in the US.  
 
As a result of these policies the US not only be-
came more and more indebted (a process that 
still continues), but also registered ever larger 
current account deficits. The reason simply is 
that you can only consume more than you pro-
duce (that is implied in a current account deficit), 
if you get other countries to give you the money 
to buy these extra goods and services from them.  
 
Hence, the US trade deficits are the outcome of 
insufficient saving of US private households, 
corporations and government. Their savings are 
insufficient to finance real investment and the 
rising debt of public and private households. Po-
litically, however, it became convenient to blame 
the exporting countries for the US trade deficits. 
Hence, their exports to the US were limited by 
“voluntary agreements” and pressure was put 
on them to open their markets to US companies. 
All that did not help of course, because the 
causes of the US deficits lie elsewhere, i.e. in its 
saving-investment gap. 
 
All this is part of the background for fundamen-
tal changes in the Korean policy regime, which 
began in the 1980s. On the one hand, there 
were the ubiquitous neo-liberal discourses, 
which identified market freedom with political 
freedom. Government regulation became a dirty 
word and was widely seen as an obstacle to 
progress and economic wellbeing. On the other 
hand, as Korea had become one of the biggest 
exporters to US markets, it was reproached for 
the protection of its own markets. Already in the 
1980s the country agreed with the IMF to liber-
alize current account transactions. As a result, 
the government could not allocate foreign ex-
change earnings under the primacy of the ac-
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cumulation regime any more. In 1993 the policy 
loans, which had been the essential stratagem to 
steer the ÅÜ~ÉÄçä, were abolished. At that time 
the World Bank was kind enough to offer a 
credit line of 100 million US dollars, which was 
íç=ÖáîÉ= äÉÖáíáã~Åó= íç= íÜÉ=éêçÖê~ããÉ=çÑ= äáÄÉê~äáJ
ë~íáçå= ~åÇ= éçäáíáÅ~ä= ëìééçêí= íç= íÜÉ= jáåáëíêó= çÑ=
cáå~åÅÉI=áå=Å~ëÉ=íÜÉ=ÉÅçåçãó=Öçí=çìí=çÑ=Åçåíêçä=
ÄÉÅ~ìëÉ=çÑ=íÜÉëÉ=ãÉ~ëìêÉëK=(!!) 
 
Apparently, Korean and World Bank officials 
were quite aware of the dangers of liberalising 
the Korean financial markets. A few years later, 
the economy was to get out of control indeed, 
yet billions, not millions, were required to stabi-
lise it.  
 
The IMF crisis 1997/98 was the biggest eco-
nomic downturn in the history of South Korea. 
Again the IMF first aggravated the crisis. The 
government used all the resources to make the 
best of a terrible situation and the IMF, after 
several months, reversed its policy. Yet, by then 
the economy had long left behind the state di-
rected accumulation regime and the deregula-
tion measures could not be reversed any more. 
To the contrary, the government of President 
Kim Dae Jung decided that it needed much lar-
ger coffers to fend off other potential future cri-
ses and liberalised the financial markets almost 
completely. Foreign investors (real and financial) 
bought Korean companies at bargain prices, and 
the Bank of Korea soon had reserves approach-
ing 100 billion dollars.  
 
Thus, from the 1980s and through the IMF crisis 
the accumulation regime was drastically trans-
formed – into a regime that responds to the 
predilections of financial markets. The role of 
government in the economy became similar to 
the one in other OECD countries. The OECD-
regime restricts the government’s role to help 
enterprises on the supply side to adapt to mar-
ket conditions. In practice, in the OECD coun-
tries this has led to little more than wage repres-
sion and unemployment – and thus to reduced 
demand by consumers. This again has been lim-
iting the appetite of firms for investments in 
fixed capital and increasing their involvements in 
expanding financial markets, where profits could 
be made with much less effort. Unfortunately, 
low levels of investment in fixed capital also 
meant that jobs for the ever better-trained 
young people became ever scarcer, while unem-
ployment increased and the social security sys-
tems got under increasing stress.  
Because the emphasis in the OECD regime is on 
the adaptation to market conditions and leaves 
the markets and enterprises largely to look after 
themselves, the roundabout accumulation of 
productive capital and the development of hu-
man resources in a longer perspective is not 
something where the states assumes much re-
sponsibility. Instead, nowadays in Korea too, the 
financial markets reign supreme and are no 
longer in a subservient position with respect to 
the real economy and the accumulation of capi-
tal. The financial markets have become largely 
solipsistic. Their gains have little to do with the 
real economy, but are generated within these 
markets themselves, often through speculation 
and the losses of badly informed small “inves-
tors”. Even manufacturing firms have found it 
easier to earn money in the financial markets 
than in their own metiers.  
 
These are harsh words. But look at the facts of 
the Korean case.  
 
Net real investment as a percentage of GDP is, 
with the exception of the crises periods men-
tioned above, is at historically low levels. Be-
cause of the low levels of net real investment, 
unemployment, in particular of young people, is 
high, while irregular employment is increasing. 
The polarisation of the economy and labour 
markets has been one of the most striking fea-
tures after the IMF crisis 1997/98. One of its 
causes is that the chaebol, the dominating large 
conglomerates, have reduced their employment 
by approximately one third, while outsourcing 
and subcontracting have increased. Productivity 
growth in turn has been high for these large 
firms, while wages in the formal sector grow 
more slowly than productivity. All this means of 
course, that the growth of incomes, internal 
demand and consumption is restrained and be-
low potential.  
 
Why is real investment low? Enterprises say, just 
like in other OECD countries, that demand is too 
low and future prospects are unclear. Obviously, 
demand is low because of low levels of net real 
investment, because of high unemployment, it-
self largely a result of too little real investment, 
because of growing informalisation and polariza-
tion of labour markets – all of which reduce in-
come growth. Clearly, we have a vicious circle 
here. Prospects are uncertain, because the gov-
ernment neither helps to stabilize investment 
horizons, nor does it give its unconditional sup-
port when things do not turn out as expected. 
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That, of course would be against the neo-liberal 
rules of the game. 
 
Furthermore, the ÅÜ~ÉÄçä are not any more “pri-
vate agencies of public purpose”. About 40 per-
cent of the stocks of Korean firms are now in 
the hands of foreign “investors”, largely pension 
funds. They certainly would not share the visions 
of policy makers (if they had any); neither could 
they be expected to allow their firms under their 
sway to engage in long-term risky investment. 
Their primary interest, quite naturally, of these 
“investors” is a steady quarterly flow of earnings 
– and to make some handy capital gains in the 
ups and downs of the stock market. How should 
one expect under these circumstances a Schum-
peterian strong and long-term commitment to 
the future of the firms in their portfolio?  
 
As firms in Korea actually earn quite well and 
invest relatively little, they need not recur to the 
banks to finance their investments, be they real 
or just financial. Even though the private house-
holds save less than before, their savings are ac-
tually not needed in order to finance real in-
vestments of enterprises. As the government 
over all is in surplus too, there is plenty of liquid-
ity in the system, which cannot be used produc-
tively.  
 
Where then happens with all that liquidity?  
 
1.  A considerable part goes to into the interna-
tional financial circuits and serves at the bot-
tom line to finance the US current-account 
and government deficits.  
2. Some part of it, is invested abroad, in “real” 
factories and in financial markets; 
3.  Another part, quite naturally, goes into the 
local financial markets, which nowadays of-
fer all sorts of nicely designed “products”.  
That means that much more liquidity than be-
fore circulates and is held within the financial 
sphere and is involved in all sorts of purely or 
largely speculative transaction. Apart from 
speculation, prices in stock, real asset and other 
markets rise because of the sheer amounts of 
money flowing into these markets.  
Diagrams 3 and 4 show one result of these 
processes, taking the blown-up and unwar-
ranted valuation of Korean incorporated firms by 
the stock market as an example. One line in Dia-
gram 3 depicts the evolution of the cumulative 
value of net fixed capital. This is a proxy for the 
value of real capital in the economy. The other 
line stands for the valuation of listed firms by the 
stock market (share price multiplied by number 
of stocks of all listed firms). Hence we have 
measures the real value of enterprises in terms 
of their accumulated capital – and their valua-
tion by the stock market.  
 
While the fluctuations are much more marked in 
the stock market, both indicators evolve more or 
less in parallel until the middle of the 1990s. Af-
ter the IMF crisis something strange happens 
however: The stock market value increases much 
more rapidly than the real value of Korean stock 
companies. The diagram clearly demonstrates 
how the stock market has been inflating the 
value of Korean listed companies far beyond 
their real value.  
 
The inflation of stock market prices impedes the 
capital allocation function of these markets even 
further (in any case they play only a very limited 
role in the financing of new investment through 
the emission of new stock; most investment is 
nowadays paid out of internal savings of firms 
and, to a lesser extent, by banks). It has other 
detrimental effects too: Corporations pay divi-
dends to the owner of their stock and they have 
to adjust these payouts to X percent of the mar-
ket value of their stock. As these values are be-
ing inflated, they have to pay out correspond-
ingly higher dividends, even though their physi-
cal capital does not increase. One logical conse-
quence of this is that either prices rise or that 
wages do not increase as fast as productivity.  
 
The latter is borne out quite clearly by reality. 
First, wages of full-time regular employees do 
not increase to the same extent as productivity. 
Second, large firms with more than 500 employ-
ees have reduced employment significantly (38 
percent between 1993 and 2005), intensifying 
strategies like outsourcing to small firms. Thus, 
third, the share of non-standard employment in 
total employment has increased from 26.9 in 
2001 to 36.7 percent.11 Here is one of the un-
derlying factors that lead to the aforementioned 
vicious circle and the exceedingly moderate in-
creases in consumption in recent years (see Dia-
gram 1). 
 
Because the banks sit on a lot of cash, they have 
started to give credits to private households too, 
something that was unheard of under the ac-
cumulation regime. First, there was the credit 
                                                 
11  Lee Byoung-hoon, Labor polarization damages social 
cohesion, Korea Herald, Nov. 27, 2007, p. 4. 
 7
card boom, which for some credit card firms and 
for very many families ended in disaster. Then 
there was mortgage financing, which in turn 
drove up prices in the real estate markets (see 
Diagram 4). The Bank of Korea and the govern-
ment were (and are) seriously concerned about 
this bubble. Therefore the government in 2007 
imposed a special tax on the sale of apartments 
above a certain value (approx. 500000 Dollars).  
 
In Diagram 2 one can see how dramatically 
household debt to banking institutions has in-
creased. Household debt by now is larger than 
the debts of non-financial enterprises. Last year 
close to 3 million people were unable to comply 
with their repayment obligations to banks, that 
is no less than 8,4 percent of the economically 
active population!  
 
In sum, the differences between the accumula-
tion regime and the OECD-type financial market 
regime are quite remarkable and even disheart-
ening.  
 
First, the liberalised financial markets were and 
are a necessary condition for the huge and fear-
some world macroeconomic problems of saving-
investment and trade disequilibria, largely 
caused by short-sighted US economic policies.  
 
Second, in Korea the liberalisation of financial 
markets has, among other things, inflated stock 
and real estate markets. This certainly has much 
to do with the lacklustre performance of its 
economy in recent years, in particular when 
compared to the one of the accumulation re-
gime of Park Chung Hee. Equally, there is much 
more uncertainty and anxiety now about the fu-
ture, while economic and social inequality have 
increased. Is it really surprising that many people 
in Korea feel such a high esteem for Park Chung 
Hee? 
 
Democracy, State and future challenges  
 
One basic difference between the two regimes is 
how they deal with savings. Park Chung Hee 
had a point there. In the accumulation regime, 
savings are directed purposefully to real accumu-
lation and modernisation. In the financial market 
regime, savings are the raw material with which 
profits are made in differentiated markets, often 
within the financial markets themselves, often in 
speculative and even illegal activities, and often 
on the back of uniformed people who are lured 
into these markets. That savings are directed 
into real investment is of almost nobody’s con-
cern. That savings are directed into the compre-
hensive modernisation of a country and its 
economy, in practice, is of no interest whatso-
ever.  
 
The results of the accumulation regime in Korea 
are far superior to the ones of the financial mar-
ket regime. That does not mean necessarily that 
the accumulation regime would also work at the 
present level of development of the Korean 
economy. Certainly, economic planning in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe did not work 
well after they had mastered standardised mass 
production. Yet, Korean economic planning was 
different and much more flexible, as it operated 
through the control of credit. As there is so 
much liquidity in the financial markets nowadays, 
and as Korean firms, in particular the large 
chaebol, enjoy high profits and possess vast 
amount of liquid assets, the old system of credit 
rationing through the state could not work any-
more.  
 
The question remains however what could be 
done to reduce the dysfunctionality of the finan-
cial markets. What is their use and common 
purpose, if they do not lead to increases in real 
investment and in the efficiency of real capital, 
and hence depress employment and labour in-
comes? What is their use and purpose, if their 
valuation of the value of enterprises is out of 
touch with their real value in terms of tangible 
and intangible assets? What is their use and 
purpose, when their role in financing new in-
vestment is only negligible? What is their use 
and purpose, when stock markets play only a 
marginal role in the allocation of new capital 
and are basically secondary markets 12 , where 
“old” stocks are traded on seas of speculative 
expectations, exacerbating inequalities of in-
come and wealth? Against this background of 
misallocation, speculation and solipsism, how 
could it happen that movements in the financial 
markets are often interpreted as divine judge-
ments on government policies, unions etc., wel-
fare states etc.? 
 
Not that there are easy answers, but it is quite 
clear that the financial markets and, to a lesser 
degree, the concentration of capital, do not op-
erate in accordance with the common good and 
therefore, if we want to face it or not, present a 
                                                 
12  Scitovsky, Tibor. 1994 “Towards a Theory of Second-
hand Markets,” Kyklos 47: 33-51. 
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challenge to democratic societies and states. 
Citizens are free as long as they do not interfere 
with the freedom and the rightful interests of 
other citizens. Why should enterprises and inves-
tors in the name of freedom be allowed to nega-
tively affect citizens and the common good? We 
seem to suffer from a blind identification of po-
litical freedom of citizens and democracy with 
the freedom of economic actors, while it ought 
to be quite clear that, at least in democratic so-
ciety, the people, government and state stand 
above the economy and economic interests. For 
the common good to be achieved, the private 
actors need to be restrained and their activities 
subject to rules and regulations set by legitimate, 
democratic governments.  
 
The accumulation regime in Korea was a regime 
where a dictator forced the private enterprises 
onto a path of modernisation and accumulation. 
It brought a fair measure of rapidly expanding 
prosperity to its “subjects”, which later, as citi-
zens of a democratic society, would feel nostal-
gic about the economic success of dictatorship. 
In contrast, the financial market regime gave 
unheard freedoms to economic actors, while its 
economic performance fell behind the dictatorial 
period. Therefore and because decision taking 
under democracy is more complex, disorderly 
and better scrutinised by the public, the financial 
market regime cum democracy has produced 
significant levels of dissatisfaction, uncertainty 
and even disenchantment with politics.  
 
Nevertheless, even though there is certain nos-
talgia for the accumulation regime, few people 
would want dictatorship to return. Hence, the 
formula “accumulation regime cum dictator-
ship” is entirely out of question, just like in all 
the other OECD countries. What people would 
prefer, in spite of the media hype around finan-
cial markets and their deceitful promises is a “an 
accumulation regime cum democracy”. Indeed, 
even it runs against most open and hidden mes-
sages of media democracy in Korea and else-
where, the central question is: Why should de-
mocracy and freedom not be compatible with a 
strong hand of state and government in the 
economy? 
 
This question turns out to be even more impor-
tant, when one considers the scarcity of natural 
resources and the destruction of natural envi-
ronments. Then the “real” problem is not one of 
insufficient, but instead of excessive accumula-
tion of real capital – and one of the distribution 
of the rights of usage and of the destruction of 
natural resources at the global as well as at the 
intra-national level. Consumerism, the craze for 
ever higher levels of consumption of something 
like 10 percent of world population, and the de-
sire to catch up with the consumerism of others, 
are the central causes of the depletion of natural 
resources and the destruction of the environ-
ment. Depletion and destruction of nature will 
continue as long as capital accumulation is 
driven by consumerism. On the other hand, 
there are billions of people whose basic needs of 
food, living, health and education are not cov-
ered.  
 
Hence, in terms of scarce global resources and 
climate change on the one side, and global jus-
tice on the other, mankind will have to find an 
entirely new model of accumulation. Surely, it 
will have to be a regime of accumulation that 
satisfies the basic needs of human being world-
wide, while it limits the overall level of consump-
tion to what is compatible with natural resources, 
including climate, available to present and future 
generations. Could anybody expect that such an 
accumulation regime, which  
 
1. respects the limits of nature (including cli-
mate),  
2. reduces, globally and within each of our na-
tions, consumption to sustainable levels while it 
enables others to consume, and  
3. rebuilds destroyed environments,  
 
could come to exist without a strong hand of 
the state, democratic states for that? Surely, a 
regime that is redistributional in terms of basic 
human needs and rights, reductionist in terms of 
accumulation and consumption, and reconstruc-
tive in terms of the environment, requires far-
reaching interference in economic and financial 
markets. Who could, in view of these challenges, 
legitimately complain about lack of freedom in 
financial and other markets?  
 
The challenges are enormous. The Korean econ-
omy too would have to change its economic re-
gime radically, in particular, because it is so 
heavily internationalised. Should we despair? 
George Monbiot13 believes that we should not:  
 
“We must confront a challenge that is as 
great and as pressing as the rise of the Axis 
                                                 
13  George Monbiot, Only full decarbonisation can save the 
earth, The Guardian Weekly, 14.12.07. 
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powers. Had we thrown up our hands then, 
as many people are tempted to do today, 
you would be reading this paper (the British 
daily “Guardian”, W.K.) in German. Al-
though the war often seemed impossible to 
win, when the political will was mobilised 
strange and implausible things began to 
happen. The US economy was spun around 
a dime in 1942 as civilian manufacturing was 
switched to military production. The state 
took on greater powers than it had exercised 
before. Impossible policies became achiev-
able.” 
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3. Market Value of Listed Stock and Cumulated Value of Fixed Capital Stock  
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 Source for Diagrams 1-3: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
